NOTE
COPYRIGHT, POTENTIAL MARKETS, AND THE USER
INTERFACE: DEFINING THE SCOPE OF
THE LIMITED MONOPOLY

INTRODUCTION

Since the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976,' courts have faced the
difficult task of applying venerable copyright principles to cases involving
computer programs. 2 The 1976 Act protects both "application" and
"system" computer programs as literary works. 3 Courts have protected both
types of programs, 4 and have made it clear that copyright protects the literal
aspects of computer programs, 5 including both source and object code. 6 This
Copyright © 1992 by Law and Contemporary Problems
In her article in this symposium (see page 311), Professor Pamela Samuelson analyzes the user
interface of Lotus 1-2-3 and concludes that only the text of the opening screens, the explanatory text
in the on-line facility, and the explanatory long prompts are expressive enough to satisfy traditional
copyright standards. Professor Samuelson, herself, then points out that reasonable minds might
disagree about what elements of the user interface are expressive enough to satisfy copyright
standards. This author is one who disagrees, believing that the expressive elements of user
interfaces are not limited to those elements listed by Professor Samuelson in her article, because user
interfaces, like music, are expressive in ways that cannot be captured in a list of elements. This note
focuses, however, on the next phase of inquiry, leaving the issue of expressiveness to be resolved by
the courts.
1. 17 USC §§ 101-810 (1982).
2. The Copyright Act defines a computer program as "a set of statements or instructions to be
used directly or indirectly in a computer program to bring about a certain result." 17 USC § 101
(1982).
3. Copyright Law Revision, HR Rep No 1476, 94th Cong, 2d Sess 54 (1976), reprinted in 1976
USCCAN 5664. Computer programs can be classified as either "system" programs or "application"
programs. System programs work together to form an operating system. An operating system
creates the environment in which application programs function, and manages the various elements
of a computer system's hardware, including the monitor and disk drives. Operating systems
communicate with the computer rather than with the user. See Note, A Thousand Clones: The Scope of
Copyright Protection in the "Look and Feel" of Computer Programs, 63 Wash L Rev 195, 196
(1988)(authored by Alan S. Middleton), citing Apple Computer v Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F2d 1240,
1243 (3d Cir 1983) (operating system programs "generally manage the internal functions of the
computer or facilitate use of application programs").
4. See, for example, Lotus Dev. Corp. v Paperback Software Intl, 740 F Supp 37, 45 (D Mass 1990),
citing Stern Electronics, Inc. v Kaufman, 669 F2d 852, 855 n3 (2d Cir 1982) ("written computer
programs are copyrightable as literary works"); SAS Inst. v S & H Computer Sys., 605 F Supp 816 (MD
Tenn 1985) (protecting application program); Franklin Computer, 714 F2d 1240 (protecting systems
program).
5. Computer programs can be printed out and observed in text form. By comparing computer
programs in their text form, mechanical duplications can be detected easily.
6. See, for example, Franklin Computer, 714 F2d at 1243 (source and object code copyrightable).
Object code is a program written in machine language that can be executed directly by the
computers' central processing unit (CPU) without need for translation. Paperback, 740 F Supp at 4344. Source code is a program written in a universal programming language, such as BASIC, that

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 55: No. 2

note focuses on application programs, which allow the user to perform a
7
specific task, such as word processing or cite checking.
Application programs present unique challenges to courts that are trying
to define the scope of copyright protection under the 1976 Act. Unlike
traditional literary works, such as books or maps, an application program,
when run on a computer, produces a nonliteral user interface. The user
interface, however, or the "look and feel" of a computer program, 8 allows a
user to communicate with a computer. 9 Some commentators have compared
the relationship of a user interface and its underlying computer program to
the face of a wristwatch and its inner workings.' 0 The user interface, however,
unlike the face of a watch, is actually a product of the underlying program. In
this respect, the user interface is similar to music, and the computer program
is like the compact disc in which the user interface is recorded. Both
computer programs and musical compositions can be recorded in literal
notation. However, a user interface, like music, is not experienced in its
literal manifestation. Additionally, a user interface, like music, can be
replicated without literal copying of its source. A musical work can be
recreated by listening and imitating the sounds without mechanically copying
the medium of fixation. A user interface can be recreated without
mechanically copying the underlying program by a process known as reverse
engineering. The term "reverse engineering" refers to a process of
recreating a program by observing the responses and output of the program
to various input and creating an independent program to achieve the same
results. For these reasons, the user interface can be thought of as the
"nonliteral" aspect of a computer program.
Moreover, computer programs that produce identical user interfaces may
not be substantially similar when viewed only in their literal forms. Since
must be translated by an interpreter to be read by a computer's CPU. Id at 44. Object code is easily
read by machines; source code is easily read by humans.
7. Note, 63 Wash L Rev at 196-97 (cited in note 3), citing Franklin Computer, 714 F2d at 1243
("Application programs usually perform a specific task for the computer user, such as word
processing, checkbook balancing, or playing a game.").
8. The term "look and feel" has been used to refer to different concepts. See, for example,
Note, Copyright Protectionfor Computer Languages: Creative Incentive or Technological Threat?, 39 Emory L J
1293, 1294 n6 (1990) (authored by Elizabeth G. Lowry). For purposes of this note, the terms "user
interface" and the "look and feel" of a computer program will be used interchangeably.
9. See Anthony Chandor, Penguin Dictionary of Computers 472 (Penguin, 3d ed 1985) (defining
user interface" as a "term used to describe any way in which a user accesses a computer system, for
example, through a visual display unit, a personal computer or a videotext terminal").
10. See, for example, Pamela Samuelson, Computer Programs, User Interfaces, and Section 102(b) of
the Copyright Act of 1976: A Critique of Lotus v. Paperback, 55 L & Contemp Probs 311 (Spring 1992).
Most people do not think of the face of a wristwatch as a user interface for its inner workings. The
typical wristwatch face consists of two hands, a numbered dial, and a device to adjust the time. The
numbered dial and hands of the wristwatch's face convert unintelligible information from the inner
workings of the watch into a readable and efficient format. Similarly, a computer program's user
interface displays information from electronic signals in an intelligible format. The external device
on a wristwatch that adjusts the time allows the user to communicate or interact with the inner
workings. Likewise, a computer program's user interface allows a user to communicate with the
underlying program. A computer program's user interface, like the face of a wristwatch, conveys
information to the user and allows communication with the underlying machine.
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most people who use computers experience only the user interface and never
see the computer program in its literal form, copyright protection for only the
literal aspects of computer programs, without protection for their nonliteral
user interfaces, would be virtually meaningless.
Copyright protection for a traditional literary work gives the author a
monopoly for a specified number of years.I However, if copyright protected
only the literal aspects of computer programs, an author of a computer
program would be protected only from mechanical duplication; and her2
monopoly would last only until another programmer could create a clone.'
Through reverse engineering, clones often can be written in a relatively short
amount of time, depending on the complexity of the original program. While
some protection of the nonliteral aspects of computer programs is
necessary, ' 3 the danger of chilling the development of new programs is great,
because courts must decide the proper scope of the copyright monopoly
without the convenience and familiarity of text to help them identify
protectible expression. For these reasons, the debate now focuses on the
scope of copyright protection for the nonliteral product of application
programs.
Most of the cases that have dealt with the issue of copyright protection for
the user interface arguably have been decided correctly, based on their
facts. 14 The language in these decisions is often ambiguous, 15 however, and
reveals a willingness to give the copyright monopoly a scope that is too
broad. 16 None of the decisions has analyzed the goals of copyright in terms of
the type of market for which the programs compete. Commentators have
heavily criticized the latest decision involving user interfaces, Lotus Development
Corp. v. Paperback Software International,17 because it can be interpreted to
provide too much protection for computer programs.i8 The uncertainty in
11. For example, an author of a book written on or after January 1, 1978 has a complete
monopoly for the work from the moment of its creation until 50 years after the author's death. 17
USC § 302(a) (1982).
12. Clones are computer programs that have virtually identical user interfaces and functions but
whose literal aspects are entirely dissimilar to the original program. Note, 63 Wash L Rev at 215
(cited in note 3). Although the user interfaces are usually identical and thus interchangeable to the
user, the computer code that creates the "clone" is an independently written program. Id. This is
possible for two main reasons: computer programs can be written in many different languages; and a
myriad of different commands can achieve the same result on a computer. Therefore, a clone would
not infringe the copyright of the source or object code in the original program if copyright
protection did not extend to the nonliteral aspects of user interfaces.
13. Copyrights of more traditional forms of literary works have been infringed by works with
nonliteral similarities. See, for example, Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v MCA, Inc., 715 F2d 1327,
1329 (9th Cir 1983) (13 alleged distinctive plot similarities between Battlestar Galactica and Star Wars
may be basis for finding copyright violation).
14. See text accompanying notes 45-96.
15. See Samuelson, 55 L & Contemp Probs at 314 n14 (cited in note 10) (arguing that copyright
cases have tended to be either lengthy and elaborately flawed, or so cryptic as to provide little
guidance on the court's reasoning).
16. Paul Goldstein, Infringement of Copyright in Computer Programs, 47 U Pitt L Rev 1119, 1125-26
(1986).
17. 740 F Supp 37 (D Mass 1990).
18. See generally, for example, Samuelson, 55 L & Contemp Probs 311 (cited in note 10);
Ronald Abramson, Why Lotus-Paperback Uses the Wrong Test and WI'hat the New Software Protection
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the level of protection for computer programs has stifled innovation and
chilled the "speech" that copyright seeks to encourage. 19 Unfortunately, the
Paperback decision will not be reviewed on appeal due to an out-of-court
20
settlement.
This note will argue that courts can reduce the amount of uncertainty
about the level of copyright protection for user interfaces by considering the
type of market for which programs compete. Computer programs with
substantially similar user interfaces compete in one of three main types of
markets: the actual market; a potential market for different hardware; and a
potential market for programs with different underlying purposes. By
considering for which market the programs compete, courts can analyze
defenses to copyright infringement more accurately and further the goals of
copyright law. This note will further argue that the monopoly afforded by
copyright should extend only to the actual market, not to any potential
markets. Even if courts do not agree that copyright protection for user
interfaces should be limited to programs that compete for the same actual
market, an analysis that uses the language of actual or potential markets
would illuminate the courts' reasoning and inject a greater degree of
predictability into their decisions.
Part II of this note provides a brief summary of the goals of copyright law
and outlines some major copyright principles that apply to user interface
decisions. Part III presents the facts of the main copyright decisions involving
the protection of user interfaces to illustrate the current state of the law and
demonstrate the uncertainty in the level of applicable copyright protection.
Part IV defines the types of markets for user interfaces and examines their
differences with respect to market incentives and the goals of copyright. Part
IV also discusses how the validity of certain infringement defenses changes
according to the type of market at issue, and concludes that copyright
protection should be limited to programs that compete in the same actual
market. Part V proposes an infringement test that would retain the ad hoc
nature of copyright decisions, yet allow software developers to predict the
outcome of future user interface cases more accurately. The conclusion
suggests that courts should recognize the different types of markets for
Legislation Should Look Like, 7 Computer L 6 (Aug 1990); D. Lee Antton & Gary M. Hoffman, The
Impact of Lotus Development v Paperback Software, 7 Computer L 1 (Aug 1990); Richard H. Stern,
Legal Protection of Screen Displays and Other User Interfacesfor Computers: A Problem in Balancing Incentives for
CreationAgainst Needfor Free Access to the Utilitarian, 14 Colum-VLAJ L & Arts 283 (1990); Note, Lotus
Development Corp. v Paperback Software International: Broad Copyright Protection For User Interfaces
Ignores the Software Industry's Trend Toward Standardization, 52 U Pitt L Rev 689 (1991) (authored by
GerardJ. Lewis, Jr.); Note, 39 Emory LJ at 1330-35 (cited in note 8).
19. See Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in
a Work's "Total Concept and Feel", 38 Emory LJ 393, 431 n192 (1989) (" 'Look-and-feel lawsuits are
already impacting product development. And because hardware and software development takes so
long, the uncertainty brought on... will affect the products we seefor up to 3 years. Some of this effect will be
irreversible.' " (quoting PC Magazine at 169 (May 26, 1987) (emphasis added), in turn quoting Dan
Bricklin, developer of the VisiCalc spreadsheet program).
20. See Samuelson, 55 L & Contemp Probs at 313 n10 (cited in note 10) (discussing details of
settlement).
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computer programs and examine the market incentives, the goals of
copyright, and the role of standardization in light of the distinct
characteristics of each market.
II
SOME FUNDAMENTALS OF COPYRIGHT LAW

The U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
' 21
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. "
Congress grants copyright monopolies to "serve the public welfare by
encouraging authors to generate new ideas and disclose them to the public,
22
being free to do so in any uniquely expressed way they may choose."
Copyright law attempts to balance the author's interest in profit against
society's interest in use. 23 Thus, courts must achieve a delicate balance
between granting too strong a monopoly and failing to offer sufficient
incentives to encourage authors to contribute to the public welfare. Either
result would chill the development of technology and undermine the goals of
copyright.
Copyright only protects the expression of ideas, not the ideas
themselves.2 4 In Baker v. Selden,2 5 the leading case on the distinction between
idea and expression, the Supreme Court ruled that a copyright on a book,
which described a new system of bookkeeping and contained forms
employing the new system, was not infringed by another book that contained
similar forms. Although the Court recognized that the book contained
copyrightable expression, it refused to extend copyright protection to the
ideas expressed by the book. 26 Thus, subsequent authors have been free to
use the ideas contained in a work if they do not infringe on the expression of
27
those ideas.
The doctrines of merger and scines dfaire limit the copyright monopoly to
ensure that copyright does not protect ideas only or chill the development of
21. US Const Art I, § 8, cl 8.
22. Paperback, 740 F Supp at 52, citing Harper & Row Publishers v Nation Enterprises, 471 US 539,
546 (1985).
23. "The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative
labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good." Twentieth Century Music Corp. v Aiken, 422 US 151, 156 (1975).
24. 17 USC § 102(b) (1982); Mazer v Stein, 347 US 201,217-18 (1954); Baker v Selden, 101 US 99,
102-03 (1880).
25. 101 US 99; see also Samuelson, 55 L & Contemp Probs at 326 n70 (cited in note 10)
(discussing Baker v. Selden).
26. Baker, 101 US at 104 ("[A]ny person may practice and use the art itself which he has
described and illustrated therein"). The Supreme Court later interpreted Baker to hold "that a
copyrighted book on a peculiar system of bookkeeping was not infringed by a similar book using a
similar plan which achieved similar results where the alleged infringer made a different
arrangement of the
columns and used different headings." Mazer, 347 US at 217 (emphasis added). Thus it appears that the
Court will protect authors against verbatim, or close to verbatim copying, but not against loose
paraphrasing. Goldstein, 47 U Pitt L Rev at 1124 (cited in note 16).
27. Nichols v Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F2d 119, 121 (2d Cir 1930).
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technology. Under the doctrine of merger, if two works are similar because
the underlying idea can be expressed only in a limited number of ways, the
expression is not protected because the idea is said to have "merged" with the
expression. 2 8 Courts frequently give factual works less protection than
fictional works due to the merger doctrine.2 9 Similarly, the doctrine of scines d
faire, or "scenes which 'must' be done, '"3 limits the protection of certain
expressions of ideas that, as a practical matter, are indispensable to the
3
treatment of a topic. '
To prove infringement of a copyright, a plaintiff must demonstrate
ownership of the copyright and actual copying by the defendant.3 2 Because
direct evidence of actual copying is often difficult to obtain, courts usually
infer actual copying by proving access to the copyrighted work3 3 and
substantial similarity3 4 between the works. To prove substantial similarity,
courts typically use the bifurcated test of Arnstein v. Porter.35 Under Arnstein,
the fact-finder must first decide whether there is sufficient similarity between
the two works to conclude that the alleged infringer used the copyrighted
work. 3 6 Expert witnesses testify on this issue, which has sometimes been
called the "extrinsic" test of substantial similarity. 3 7 If the answer to the first
question is affirmative, the fact-finder then moves to the "intrinsic" test, which
is decided without the aid of expert testimony. Under this test, the fact-finder
decides, from the perspective of the "lay observer," whether the copying was
38
"illicit" or "an unlawful appropriation" of the copyrighted work.
Traditionally, copyright has protected authors from infringements by
works in the same market as the copyrighted work, as well as from
infringements in "potential" markets.3 9 In fact, Congress requires courts to
28.

See, for example, Herbert RosenthalJewelry Corp. v Kalpakian, 446 F2d 738, 742 (9th Cir 1971)

(applying the merger doctrine to a jeweled bee pin).
29. Note, 63 Wash L Rev at 205 (cited in note 3), citing Landsberg v Scrabble Crossword Game
Players, 736 F2d 485, 488 (9th Cir 1984).
30. Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, 3 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.03 [B] [4] (1991) ("Nimmer on
Copyright"), citing Walker v Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F2d 44, 50 (2d Cir 1986).
31. Atari, Inc. v North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp., 672 F2d 607, 616 (7th Cir 1982).
32. Note, Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. Cams, Inc.-The Legal Fiction Created by a Single
Copyright Registration of a Computer Program and Its Display Screens, 65 Notre Dame L Rev 536, 545-46

(1990) (authored by Ginamarie A. Guadio).
33. Although access is generally defined as the opportunity to copy, some courts have required
proof that the duplicating author knew of and viewed the original work. 3 Nimmer on Copyright at
§ 13.02 (cited in note 30).
34. Courts with difficulty must draw lines to determine substantial similarity:
Somewhere between the one extreme of no similarity and the other complete and literal
similarity lies the line marking off the boundaries of "substantial similarity." Judge Learned
Hand has said that this line "wherever it is drawn will seem arbitrary" and that "the test for
infringement of a copyright is of necessity vague."
3 Nimmer on Copyright at § 13.03[A] (cited in note 30), quoting Nichols, 45 F2d at 122, and Peter Pan
Fabrics v Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F2d 487, 489 (2d Cir 1960).

35.
36.

37.
38.
39.
article);

154 F2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir 1946).
Whelan Associates, Inc. vJaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F2d 1222, 1232 (3d Cir 1986).

Id.
Id.
See Harper, 471 US at 568 (protecting a book against quotation before publication in a news
but see Sony Corp. v Universal City Studios, 464 US 417 (1984) (holding that to allow "time
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consider the effect of an infringing use upon the potential market of a work
when evaluating a fair use defense. 40 Fair use is a statutory defense that
excuses infringements of copyright for certain purposes including criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research. 4 ' Courts have
interpreted the protection of the potential market as the single most
important element of fair use,4 2 but have not required any showing of actual
harm, only a showing by a "preponderance of the evidence that some
meaningful likelihood of future harm [to the potential market] exists." 4 3 The
fair use defense, though somewhat beyond the scope of this note, is
mentioned here to illustrate that the concept of potential markets is firmly
rooted in copyright law. It is also important to note that Congress does not
require courts to protect potential markets but only to "consider[] . .. the

effect [of a copyright infringement]
'44
copyrighted work]."

upon the potential market [of a

III
SIGNIFICANT USER INTERFACE CASES

The facts of four of the most significant decisions involving user interfaces
illustrate the current uncertainty about the relevant level of copyright
protection. The following discussion of these cases is limited to the aspects of
the cases that illustrate the ambiguity in the courts' decisions and the role that
an analysis of potential markets could play.
A.

Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.

Whelan was the first decision to address directly the copyright issues
relating to protection for computer programs' user interfaces. 4 5 Whelan
shifting" through home videotaping would not cause any likelihood of nonminimal harm to the
potential market of copyrighted broadcasts).
40. "In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the
factors to be considered shall include ... (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work." 17 USC § 107 (1988).
41. 17 USC § 107. The statute names four factors to be considered when evaluating a defense
of fair use:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as
a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
Id (emphasis added).
42. Harper, 471 US at 566.
43. Sony, 464 US at 451. Included in the protection of potential markets is protection for
derivative works. Harper at 568. "A derivative work is a work based upon one or more preexisting
works, such as a translation .
17 USC § 101.
44. 17 USC § 101.
45. Whelan, 797 F2d 1222. Courts had faced similar issues in earlier decisions involving
videogame copyrights. See M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v Andrews, 783 F2d 421 (4th Cir 1986); Williams Elec.,
Inc. v Artic Intl, Inc., 685 F2d 870 (3d Cir 1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v Strohon, 564 F Supp 741 (ND Ill
1983).
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Associates developed a computer program named "Dentalab" to perform
46
basic bookkeeping and administrative tasks for Jaslow Dental Laboratory.
Whelan and Jaslow then entered into a contract, in which Whelan agreed to
continue to improve the program, and Jaslow agreed to market it.4 7 Jaslow
realized that there might be a market for a program that served essentially the
same function as Dentalab but was written in a different computer language to
operate on different hardware. 48 Jaslow then independently created a new
program named "Dentcom" and marketed it as "a new version of the
Dentalab computer system."' 49 Jaslow developed the Dentcom program to
capture the potential market of Dentalab for computers with different
hardware. Although Dentcom was not a literal translation of Dentalab, the
programs had virtually identical screen outputs, file structures, and
subroutines. 50 Whelan filed suit in the federal district court, claiming that the
Dentcom program infringed its copyright for Dentalab. The district court
ruled for Whelan, finding that Dentcom was substantially similar to Dentalab
due to its structure and general organization, although it was not a direct
transliteration and was written in a different computer language. 5' The Third
52
Circuit affirmed.
The Third Circuit held that copyright protection could extend beyond the
literal source and object code to the program's "structure, sequence, and
organization" ("SSO"). 53 The Whelan court then departed from established
copyright principles by rejecting the Arnstein5 4 bifurcated substantial-similarity
test 55 and formulating a new method of distinguishing between unprotectable
ideas and protectable expression in computer software. The court based this
new test on its analysis of Baker v. Selden,5 6 and suggested that "the purpose or
46. Whelan, 797 F2d at 1226.
47. Id.
48. Id. Computer programs are written in specific languages for specific types of hardware.
External constraints limit the types of software that will work on a computer. For example, a
program written to operate on IBM computers will not operate on the Macintosh system.
49. Id at 1227.
50. Id at 1228. The five subroutines that controlled order entry, invoicing, accounts receivable,
end-of-day procedure, and end-of-month procedure were performed almost identically in both
programs. Id.
51. Id at 1229.
52. Id at 1248.
53. Id. The Whelan court used the terms "structure," "sequence," and "organization"
interchangeably and intended them to be synonymous. Id at 1224. Although "structure, sequence,
and organization" (SSO) is sometimes used to refer to a user interface, the phrase can refer to many
aspects of a computer program that are unrelated to a user interface. For example, the Whelan court
rests its holding mainly on the similarities between the SSO of two computer program's file
structures, id at 1242-48, that the user does not experience in day-to-day use of the program. While
the file structure may have an indirect effect on the way that a program "looks and feels," it is not a
part of the user interface. Thus, although the SSO includes the user interface, it is not limited to
aspects of the user interface.
54. See text accompanying notes 35-38.
55. Whelan, 797 F2d at 1232. The court rejected the test due to the complexity of computer
programs, the unfamiliarity of this technology to most members of the public, and the doubtful value
of the test when the same trier of fact is used for both extrinsic and intrinsic tests (since the factfinder cannot forget the expert testimony for the intrinsic part of the test). Id at 1232-33.
56. 101 US 99 (1880).
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function of a utilitarian work would be the work's idea, and everything that is
not necessary to that purpose or function would be part of the expression of
the idea." 5 7 The court rejected the argument that copyright protection for
computer programs would retard progress by interfering with the "steppingstones" method of progress used by programmers. 58 According to the court,

"progress in computer technology or technique [was not] qualitatively
59
different from progress in other areas of science or the arts."
The Whelan court rested its decision primarily on the similarity of the SSO
in the file structures and subroutines of the two programs, 60 both of which are
not a part of the user interface. In fact, Whelan did not even claim
infringement with respect to the screen outputs. 6 ' While the decision did
mention their similarity, the court did not consider the screen output to be
covered by the same copyright as the computer program, and referred to the
similarity as merely "indirect, inferential evidence of the nature of material
covered by another copyright." 62 Thus, the Whelan decision has limited value
in user interface cases beyond its holding that copyright protection can
extend beyond the literal source and object code of computer programs.
B.

Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc.

Broderbund,63 like Whelan, involved a program that exploited the potential
market for different hardware. In Broderbund, however, the claim was based
entirely on the similarity of the user interfaces. Broderbund Software owned
64
the rights to a program called "Print Shop" that created greeting cards.
Print Shop was developed for Apple computers and would not function on
IBM computers because the two systems' hardware are incompatible.
Broderbund began negotiations with Unison World to convert Print Shop
into a program that could be used on IBM computers. 65 As a result of the
negotiations, Unison began writing an independent program for IBM
computers that simulated Print Shop as closely as possible. 6 6 During the
57. Whelan, 797 F2d at 1236. The Whelan purpose test has been heavily criticized by
commentators. See, for example, Note, Idea, Process, or Protected Expression?: Determining the Scope of
Copyright Protectionof the Structure of Computer Programs,88 Mich L Rev 866, 879-85 (1990) (authored by

Steven R. Englund); Note, Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories: Copyright Protectionfor
Computer Software Structure-What's the Purpose?, 1987 Wis L Rev 859 (1987) (authored by Thomas M.

Gage). One of the main faults of the "purpose" test is that it falsely assumes that a computer
program is composed of only one idea. Thus, courts using this test may wrongly protect many ideas
as expression.
58. Whelan, 797 F2d at 1238. The "stepping-stones" method of progress refers to the process of
making a series of improvements, each one building on the last. See Note, Copyright Infringement of
Computer Programs: A Modification of the Substantial Similarity Test, 68 Minn L Rev 1264, 1292 (1984)

(authored by Howard Root).
59. Whelan, 797 F2d at 1238.
60. Id at 1245-48.
61. Id at 1244.
62. Id at 1243-46.
63.

Broderbund Software, Inc. v Unison World, Inc., 648 F Supp 1127 (ND Cal 1986).

64.
65.
66.

Id at 1129-30.
Id at 1130.
Id.
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development process, negotiations between Broderbund and Unison broke
down. 6 7 Consequently, Unison stopped trying to replicate Print Shop, but it
continued to develop a program named "Printmaster," which had started as
the IBM duplicate of Print Shop. 6 8 Although Unison was no longer trying to
simulate Print Shop, it did not discard the previously written user interfaces
that emulated Print Shop. 69 Printmaster was actually an enhanced version of
Print Shop; the programmers added improved features after the negotiations
broke down, and they were no longer constrained to create an exact duplicate
70
of Print Shop.
Even though Whelan only considered the screen displays as inferential
evidence of other infringement. The court in Broderbund read Whelan as
holding that copyright protection "is not limited to the literal aspects of a
computer program, but rather . . . extends to the overall structure of a

program, including its audiovisual displays;" 7 1 using the Arnstein substantial
similarity test, 7 2 the court found that Printmaster infringed the Print Shop

copyright because the "look and feel" of the user interfaces was substantially
similar. 73 The Broderbund case thus protected the potential market of Print
Shop against an enhanced program with added features solely due to the
similarity between their nonliteral user interfaces.
C.

Digital Communications Associates, Inc. v. Softkione Distributing Corp.

The dispute in Softklone concerned the rights to a computer program
owned by Digital called "Crosstalk," which allowed computers to
communicate with one another. 74 Softklone obtained a commercially
available copy of the program and independently wrote a program named
75
"Mirror" that was identical to Crosstalk in both look and operation.
Although Softklone did not copy any of the literal aspects of Crosstalk, the
two programs' user interfaces were virtually identical. 76 Crosstalk and Mirror
competed in the same actual market; both were designed to serve the same
primary purpose, facilitating communication between computers, and to
operate on the same hardware.
67. Id at 1131.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Idat 1133.
72. However, the court opined that an integrated test involving expert testimony and analytic
dissection would be the wave of the future. Id at 1136.
73. Id at 1137. The court observed that "a mere list[] of similarities [could] not adequately
Id. See Pamela Samuelson & Robert Glushko,
convey the impression of overall similarity .... .
Comparing the Views of Lawyers and User Interface Designers on the Software Copyright "Look and Feel" Lawsuits,
30 Jurimetrics J 121 (1989) (criticizing "look and feel" lawsuits).
74. Digital Communications Associates, Inc. v Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F Supp 449, 452 (ND Ga
1987).
75. Id at 453. The Mirror program is a classic example of a clone.
76. Id.
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The Softklone court held that the user interface was copyrightable as a
literary work, 77 and found that Mirror was an infringement of Digital's
copyright of Crosstalk. In so doing, it rejected Softklone's arguments that the
idea and expression had merged, 78 the screen was an uncopyrightable blank
form, 79 and the user interface should not be protected due to the importance

of standardization in the computer industry.8 0 The Softklone court followed
the Whelan "purpose" test to distinguish between idea and expression. 8 '
Since the user interfaces of Crosstalk and Mirror were identical, the court did
not have to analyze the programs to establish substantial similarity.8 2 It is
important to note that the Softklone court relied on Whelan to reject the
defendant's standardization argument without pointing out the differences
between the types of programs and markets at issue in Whelan.83 This failure
laid the groundwork for the broad generalizations found in later decisions
that have caused much uncertainty about the level of copyright protection for
user interfaces.
D. Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software International
Paperback is the most recent case to struggle with the difficulties of defining
copyright protection for the user interface.8 4 The defendant, Paperback
Software, developed a spreadsheet program named VP-Planner for IBM
personal computers.8 5 While improving VP-Planner, Paperback observed
Lotus 1-2-3 for the first time and noted its commercial success. 86 Based on
this observation, Paperback concluded that it would have to make VP-Planner
compatible with Lotus 1-2-3 to compete in the market. 8 7 Paperback then
proceeded to convert VP-Planner into a "workalike for 1-2-3" by revising the
hierarchical menu structure, ensuring that all keystroke sequences produced
the same result, adding certain functions of 1-2-3, and deleting functions that
were not part of 1-2-3.88 The VP-Planner manual described itself as a
"feature-for-feature workalike for 1-2-3," and claimed that it was "designed to
77. Id at 465. The court concluded that a computer program's copyright protection did not
extend to a program's screen displays and thus required the plaintiff to establish actual copying by a
basis other than merely looking at the screen and creating a clone, such as proving that defendant
copied the source or object code. Id at 455-56. However, the plaintiff in this case had obtained
copyright registration on the Crosstalk status screen; the court used this copyright to protect the
program. Id at 456. The Copyright Office later ruled that a program and its screen displays are one
work, protected by a single copyright. Notice of Registration Decision: Registration and Deposit of
Computer Screen Displays, 53 Fed Reg 21,817 (1988).
78. Softklone, 659 F Supp at 465.
79. Id at 460.
80. Id at 462.
81. Id at 458.
82. They did, however, cite the substantial similarity test used in Arnstein. Id at 464.
83. Id at 462. See text accompanying notes 54-55 (discussing the "stepping-stone" argument
rejected in Whelan).
84. Paperback, 740 F Supp 37.
85. Id at 68-70.
86. Id at 69.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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work like Lotus 1-2-3, keystroke for keystroke." 8 9 Lotus 1-2-3 and VPPlanner competed in the same actual market because both programs
functioned on the same hardware and had the same basic purpose of
spreadsheet creation.
The court in Paperback departed from both the bifurcated substantialsimilarity test of Arnstein and the purpose test of Whelan. In place of these
tests, the court adopted a three-part test to determine copyrightability:
FIRST .... the decisionmaker must focus upon alternatives that counsel may suggest,
or the court may conceive, along the scale from the most generalized conception to the most
particularized and choose some formulation-some conception or definition of the
idea-for the purpose of distinguishing between the idea and its expression ...
SECOND, the decisionmaker must focus upon whether an alleged expression of the
idea is limited to elements essential to the expression of that idea (or is one of only a
few ways of expressing the idea) or instead includes identifiable elements of
expression not essential to every expression of that idea. THIRD, having identified
elements of expression not essential to every expression of the idea, the
decisionmaker must focus on whether those elements are a substantial part of the
allegedly copyrightable "work." 90

The court stated that "[ifn the decisionmaker, weighing the relevant factors,
determines that the legal test applying the idea-expression distinction is
satisfied, copyrightability is established.- 91 Applying this standard, the court
found that VP-Planner infringed the copyright of Lotus 1-2-3.92 Although the
court used "nonliteral" terminology, the opinion relies on "verbatim
copyright" to support its finding of infringement. 93 The court rejected the
defendant's defenses based on the need for compatibility and
standardization. 94 While the court's rationale for rejecting the defenses may
have been sound on the facts, its language was ambiguous and potentially
overbroad for two reasons. First, the court neglected to point out the
differences between the types of programs and markets at issue in Paperback
with those of Broderbund and Whelan. Second, the court used the general term
"standardization" to refer to a defense that differed significantly from the
defense presented in Broderbund, which referred to the similar defense used in
Whelan. The Paperback decision has been heavily criticized because its
ambiguity can be interpreted as protecting an overly broad copyright
monopoly for user interfaces. 95
While most would agree that the cases discussed above reached the
desired result based on their facts, 9 6 each decision has added ambiguity to the
89. Id. Although VP-Planner was virtually identical to 1-2-3, there were differences in the startup screens, placement on the screen of the menu lines, exact wording of the long prompts,
organization of the help screens, and in the increased width of the VP-Planner screen, which allowed
the user to hide certain columns. Id at 70.
90. Id at 60-61 (emphasis in original).
91. Id at 61.
92. Id at 84.
93. Id at 70.
94. Id at 77-79.
95. See note 18 (listing articles criticizing Paperback).
96. Although most commentators agree that these cases reached the desired result, some argue
that copyright law was not the proper medium for reaching those results. See, for example, Richard
A. Beutel, Trade Dress Protection For the "Look and Feel" of Software: A New Source of Proprietary Rights
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law because the courts neglected to recognize the differences in the facts and
used general phrases to describe significantly different concepts. The next
section will argue that this uncertainty can be lessened by analyzing user
interfaces in terms of their potential markets and recognizing the differences
in defenses, such as standardization, when raised in each market.
IV
ANALYZING THE PROTECTION OF USER INTERFACES IN TERMS OF
POTENTIAL MARKETS

For traditional

literary works such as books, copyright

protects all

potential markets and makes no attempt to classify the potential markets into
conceptual categories. 9 7

Similarly, none of the major decisions involving

user interfaces has attempted to distinguish the differences among potential
markets.9 8 However, the potential markets for user interfaces, unlike those
for other literary works, can be organized into distinct categories. By using
these categories, courts can properly identify relevant market incentives and
evaluate

defenses

based

on

standardization.

Although

courts

and

commentators typically refer to standardization as if it were a single concept
that has equal force regardless of the type of program99 or market at issue,
standardization arguments and market incentives differ greatly according to
Protection For the Software Industry?, 5 Computer L 1 (Oct 1988) (suggesting that a trade dress theory
rather than copyright should be used to protect software).
97. Although the courts distinguish these derivative works, parody and criticism are not
considered exploitations of potential markets for the purposes of this note. See note 43 (explaining
derivative work).
98. See text accompanying notes 45-96.
99. Most commentators base their standardization arguments on cases that involved
spreadsheet programs. See, for example, Note, 39 Emory L J at 1293 (cited in note 8) (basing
standardization and language arguments on Ashton-Tate v Fox Software and Santa Cruz Operation, No 886837-TJH (CD Cal filed Nov 18, 1988), and Paperback, 740 F Supp 37); Note, 52 U Pitt L Rev at 689
(cited in note 18) (basing standardization argument on Lotus, 740 F Supp 37). However, spreadsheet
programs are distinguishable from most other computer programs. A spreadsheet program, such as
Lotus 1-2-3, helps the user create worksheets, graphs, and documents based on the information
calculated or stored in the worksheet. Lotus 1-2-3 Release 3.1: Tutorial vii (Lotus Dev. Corp., 1990). A
worksheet is a "grid that provides a structure for entering and calculating data, and storing and
organizing information." Id at 1-1 (emphasis added). Thus, a worksheet is actually a type of
program that a user creates by using Lotus 1-2-3 or any spreadsheet program. When the worksheet
is conceptualized as a program, the user interface can be analogized to a language that is used to
create the "worksheet" program. When the user interface is discussed in this analytical framework
and analogized to a language, the arguments for not protecting the user interface sound compelling.
The user interface for spreadsheet programs presents only the exception to the rule, however, not
the rule itself.
Most programs, such as word processors like WordPerfect 5.1, graphics programs like CorelDraw
3.0, and graphic interfaces like Windows 3.0, allow the operator to use the program only to create
output or perform the functions originally included with the program, not to create new programs
such as worksheets.
Although even non-spreadsheet programs allow the user to create miniprograms called macros, which are "a series of keystrokes and []commands that perform [the main
program] tasks," id at 5-1, the user cannot create independent programs, beyond these shortcuts for
existing keyboard commands..
While programs will not always fall cleanly into either the category of spreadsheet-type programs,
which create independent programs, or non-spreadsheet programs, which can create only macros
(for example, WordPerfect 5.1 has limited spreadsheet-like capabilities that allow the user to store

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 55: No. 2

the potential market at issue. A proper evaluation of these potential markets
will aid courts in providing the proper balance of copyright protections.
Computer programs that have substantially similar user interfaces
compete in one of three main markets: the actual market, potential markets
for different hardware, and potential markets for programs with different

underlying purposes. The following sections will discuss each type of market
and identify the associated market incentives and standardization arguments.

A.

The Actual Market

User interfaces with underlying programs that operate on compatible
hardware and share the same basic purpose l0 0 compete in the same actual
market. Programmers create clones' 0 ' of popular programs to compete in the
same actual market for two main reasons. First, they create clones to attract
purchasers who are familiar with the existing program but cannot afford its
price. A programmer can duplicate an existing program through reverse
engineering without investing as much money in research and development as
the developer of the original program. 0 2

Since the existing program is

popular, the second programmer does not need to spend as much money for
marketing. Consequently, the second programmer can offer the clone for a
lower price, attracting both users who could not afford the existing program
and new users who could afford it but choose to save money by purchasing
the clone. The facts in Sofiklone represent this situation. 0 3 Mirror was a
practically identical clone of Crosstalk that sold for a significantly lower
04
price. 1
Second, programmers create clones of popular programs to attract users

who are hesitant to learn a different user interface or users who have files
created by the existing program that cannot operate properly with a new user
commands in a document to calculate data), recognition of the main purpose and operation of a
program would help a trier of fact evaluate standardization arguments.
Some commentators base standardization arguments relating to retraining costs on the training
costs for spreadsheet programs. While complex programs such as Lotus 1-2-3 do have relatively
high training costs, training costs for programs vary with the complexity of the program. See Note,
Litigation as a Mechanism for Inefficiency in Software Copyright Law, 39 UCLA L Rev 397, 400 nl0 (1991)
(authored by William H. Wright) (rudimentary training cost for each user of Lotus 1-2-3 is
approximately one thousand dollars). Additionally, retraining costs are greatly reduced if the
competing program directs training at users who are familiar with other, similar programs. See, for
example, Product Profiles, 3 PC Sources 504 (Jan 1992) (describing Word for Windows 2.0). Thus, the
barriers created by training costs will vary greatly, depending on both the type of programs involved
and the knowledge of the user.
100. For example, the purpose of an underlying program may be word processing, spreadsheets
creation, or graphics generation.
101. See note 12 and accompanying text.
102. Some commentators contend that developers, after reverse engineering another program,
incur substantially equal costs in manufacturing a competing product. See, for example, Dennis S.
Karjala, Copyright, Computer Software, and the New Protectionism, 28JurimetricsJ 33, 56 (1987). However,
clone programs often sell for an amount that is substantially less than that of the original program.
See, for example, note 104.
103. See text accompanying notes 74-83.
104. The list price for Crosstalk was $195 while Mirror sold for $69.95. Note, 63 Wash L Rev at
215 n154 (cited in note 3), citing PC Clones, Premier Edition 1987, at 8.
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interface. This type of clone usually runs faster or contains additional
valuable features not included in the original program. 0 5 The facts of
Paperback illustrate this situation.' 0 6 Clones created for this purpose arguably
advance the science and useful arts by improving the existing program.
However, if courts do not protect the original program from competition by
clones, the original author may not recover his or her original development
0 7
and marketing costs.'
Some argue that standardization of user interfaces encourages the
development of the underlying programs. 0 8 If a user does not have to
consider the time and expense involved with learning a new user interface, the
user will choose a program based solely on the functionality of the underlying
program, not on the user interface.' 0 9 Additionally, clone manufacturers
argue that standardization serves the public interest by encouraging the
development of improved and less expensive competing programs with
common interfaces. While standardization could encourage competition in
the underlying program, it also could have a chilling effect on the
development of new underlying programs because it endangers the software
developer's ability to recoup development expenses." 0 For the same reasons,
standardization removes the incentives to invest time and money'
to
develop improved user interfaces.
Other commentators argue that standardization is necessary where the
original program has a monopoly created by user preference or resistance to
change.' 12 If a product, such as a typewriter keyboard, gains widespread
public acceptance, and copyright protects the layout of the keys for the
keyboard, users become locked-in to the original product since competitors
cannot emulate the popular layout of keys.' iS The commentators argue that
once the lock-in phenomenon begins, competitors no longer have incentives
105. This type of clone is a derivative work. See note 43.
106. See text accompanying notes 84-95.
107. Traditional copyright theories for literary works reserve the right to make derivative works
to the original author. See note 43.
108. The defendant in SoftAlone argued that the need for standardization in the computer industry
justified its creation of Mirror, a clone of plaintiff's Crosstalk program. Note, 63 Wash L Rev at 214
n151 (cited in note 3). The defendant in Paperback also presented a standardization defense. See
Paperback, 740 F Supp at 77-79 (rejecting standardization argument). However, the exact reasoning
of the defense was not recorded in the decision. Id.
109. See Note, 63 Wash L Rev at 214-16 (cited in note 3) (discussing standardization arguments).
110. The user interface is often the determinative factor in the marketability of a program. Id at
216.
111. Software developers invest substantial amounts of time and money in developing user
interfaces. "For example, Xerox employees 'devoted about thirty work-years to the design of the
Star user interface . . . [and] worked for two years before [writing] a single line of actual product
software.' " Id at 216 n158, quoting Dr. David C. Smith, et al, Designing the Star User Interface, BYTE
242, 246 (April 1982) (emphasis in original).
112. See, for example, Karjala, 28JurimetricsJ at 44-48 (cited in note 102) (discussing monopoly
through user preference or resistance to change); Note, The Incompatibility of Copyright and Computer
Software: An Economic Evaluation and a Proposalfor a Marketplace Solution, 66 NC L Rev 977, 997-98
(1988) (authored by Vance Franklin Brown) (arguing that protection of the user interface would
create an insurmountable barrier to entry due to retraining costs).
113. Karjala, 28 Jurimetrics J at 45-46 (cited in note 102).
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to create products that offer small sequential improvements to the existing
product, because users will not learn the new keyboard unless the
improvements are significant enough to justify the time and expense."14 In
this situation, competing developers may not invest money into research and
development because it is difficult to predict the significance of improvements
until after the development process is complete.
For user interfaces that compete in the same actual market, the user
preference monopoly argument does not justify infringement of expression
that meets the traditional tests for copyright. First, the user-preference
monopoly argument assumes that improvement can be achieved only through
separate, self-sufficient products. However, computer programmers can
create add-in programs"1 5 to achieve the desired sequential improvements.
By working with the existing program, users do not have to leave the widely
accepted user interface of the existing program."t 6 Thus, if a programmer
develops an improved spell-checking section for an existing word processing
program, he or she could market the new spell-checker as an "improvement"
program that alters the popular existing word processor. Users who own the
original program could then purchase the improved spell-checking program
and load it into their computer. 1 7 Since the users must purchase both the
original and the improvement program, add-in programs preserve the
incentives and monopolies for both authors. In this manner, competing
programmers can create small, sequential improvements in existing computer
programs without encountering the obstacle of user-preference monopolies
and without destroying the incentives of the original programmer." 8
Second, the user-preference monopoly argument, when stating that
retraining costs create an "insurmountable barrier" to competition,"1 9 fails to
20
recognize that these costs differ with various types of programs and users.
114. Idat46.
115. Add-in programs are independent programs that either alter or work with an existing
program. Add-in programs, such as Norton Desktop for Windows, are fairly common in today's
computer software market.
116. This possibility was not practical with past technology due to the difficulty in physically
modifying mechanical products, such as the typewriter example used to justify the standardization
argument.
117. This is true only for programs that are designed to compete in the same actual market. If
the programs are designed for use on different hardware, the improvement program cannot work
with the existing program. Similarly, if the programs are designed for different purposes, the
improvement will often not work with an existing program because the improvements are often
program specific. However, add-in programs are quite effective for programs that compete for the
same actual market. Unlike clumsy mechanical adapters, add-in programs merge so effectively with
the original program that the user cannot tell that it was not an original part of the program.
118. The court in Paperback recognized the faults of the user preference monopoly argument and
implicitly rejected it by discussing the role of add-in programs. Paperback, 740 F Supp at 78-79.
119. See Note, 66 NC L Rev at 997-98 (cited in note 112).
120. Retraining costs are related to the complexity of the program. For example, the retraining
costs for a relatively simple program such as Crosstalk will be substantially less than for a more
complex program such as Lotus 1-2-3. See note 99. Further, retraining costs will be less for
individuals and small businesses than for major corporations with numerous employees to retrain.
For example, if a program's retraining cost is equal to X, a business owning one program that needs
to train one employee will experience a total retraining cost equal to X. However, a business owning
one program that needs to train five employees will experience a total retraining cost equal to 5X.
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Additionally, retraining costs are zero for new users in the market who are
unfamiliar with any programs. Thus, it is improbable that retraining costs will
create an insurmountable barrier to competition because competitors can
target either new users in the market or users who have lower retraining
costs.' 2 1 Competitors can capture part of the market by offering a product
that sells for a lower price or one that contains improved features.' 22 For
these same reasons, it is unlikely that owners of existing copyrights for user
interfaces would take unfair advantage of the monopoly created by user
23
preference by raising the price too high.'
Finally, commentators argue that standardization is necessary to allow
transfer of computer files among users. 12 4 However, secondary programs
could use conversion programs to overcome incompatibility created by
different user interfaces. 12 5 While conversion programs do require an extra
step to gain compatibility, they are a feasible solution to the compatibility
problems created by transfering files between programs with different user
interfaces.
Courts should protect user interfaces that compete for the same actual
market because standardization is not necessary and could erode the market
incentives that copyright seeks to preserve. When the benefits of
standardization can be achieved through alternate means, standardization
should not be used as a justification for infringements that endanger the
incentives that copyright seeks to preserve.

While this example oversimplifies the problem by ignoring the possibilities for group training
discounts, the point remains true that training costs vary with the number of people to be trained.
121. Evidence of competition can be seen by looking at the market for computer spreadsheets.
Although Lotus 1-2-3 holds the largest share of the market, a computer user may still choose another
competitor such as Microsoft Excel, Quattro Pro, Wingz, Allways, or Supercalc V.
122. The competitor's success will depend upon a number of factors, including the complexity of
the program, the average retraining costs, the number of new users entering the market, the amount
of improvement over the existing program, and the price difference between the new and existing
program.
123. Some commentators have argued that granting copyright protection to the user interface
would result in unreasonable prices for computer software. See note 99. However, a recent
advertisement listed the price of Lotus 1-2-3, even after its successful copyright suit, as only $389.00
(version 3.1) as compared with other popular spreadsheets such as Microsoft Excel ($293.00),
Quattro Pro ($308.00), and Wingz for Windows ($329.00). PC Sources 96 (Jan 1992). The higher the
price of the program, the more likely competitors can lure away new users to the market and users
that have lower retraining costs. Further, if a developer raises the price of software too much, he or
she will encourage the creation and distribution of illegal, private copies among consumers to avoid
paying the prohibitive price. Additionally, it is unlikely that a software producer would ever raise the
price of the program to a level that is above the price of competing programs plus average retraining
costs. Even if the software producer priced a program at a price equal to the cost of the competing
program plus the cost of retraining, a program that is more efficient or easier to use could sway
purchasers to lose money in the initial retraining period in favor of long range considerations.
124. Note, 52 U Pitt L Rev at 693 (cited in note 18).
125. The court in Lotus rejected this argument recognizing that translation programs, such as the
one used by Microsoft Excel, are a practical solution to incompatibility problems. Lotus, 740 F Supp at
78.
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Potential Markets for Different Hardware

An existing program can be translated or rewritten for use on different
types of hardware. 12 6 Each type of incompatible hardware represents a
potential market for existing programs. The Whelan and Broderbund cases
involve disputes about programs attempting to exploit this type of potential
market.'

27

If the courts protect this potential market, hardware that is too new to have
a large market,' 28 or that has a distinct but limited market, might never benefit
from the technology developed for other hardware.' 2 9 Although it may be
fairly easy to translate some computer programs for use on other types of
hardware, the programmer of the original program does not have an incentive
to translate the original program unless he or she perceives a large enough
market to justify the expense of translation. Even if courts do not protect this
potential market, the original author has a great advantage over those seeking
to translate the program because he or she is intimately familiar with it.I30
Thus, by not protecting this potential market, courts encourage the original
programmer to take advantage of his or her knowledge of the program by
quickly translating it for use on other hardware before competitors develop
similar programs. If courts protect the potential market for different
hardware, they could chill the development of technology, because some
types of hardware might never benefit from advances made in software
programs developed for other hardware.
The need for standardization in the computer industry is compelling in
this situation because programs written for different types of hardware will
not erode the economic incentives that copyright seeks to secure for an
author. The programmer of a clone written for different hardware than the
original program is not competing for the same customers as the original.
The clone will harm the original program's market only if the hardware for
which the clone is designed is superior to the hardware of the original
program. Software should not be protected by copyright against market
losses caused by consumers choosing to invest in improved hardware.
The user-preference monopoly argument is more persuasive when the
program competes in the potential market for two reasons. First, protection
for the potential market in this situation could chill the development of
technology by causing consumers to choose hardware based on the available
software rather than on the merits of the hardware itself. Consumers might
be reluctant to choose improved hardware, due to fears about the availability
126. This situation is analogous to the traditional translation of a literary work from one language
to another, which is protected as a derivative work.
127. See text accompanying notes 45-73.
128. New types of hardware may never gain widespread acceptance unless programs that have a
widespread following are quickly available for use on the new hardware due to the consumer "lockin" problems discussed in notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
129. See Karjala, 28JurimetricsJ at 78 (cited in note 102) (discussing the dangers of offering too
much protection to programs against programs that operate on different hardware).
130. See id at 79 (discussing advantage of knowledge to original programmer).

Page 355: Spring 19921

SCOPE OF THE LIMITED MONOPOLY

of software, and thus the new hardware might not gain a sufficient market to
create the incentives necessary to convince programmers to transliterate
existing programs for the new hardware. By not protecting potential markets
for different hardware, courts would create the incentive for software
developers to translate their programs for as many types of hardware as
possible, and consumers would not be discouraged from investing in
improved hardware due to fears about software unavailability.
Second, add-in programs cannot be used to achieve sequential
improvements in this type of potential market.isi Add-in programs work with
existing programs. Thus, a secondary programmer is not able to provide
sequential improvements in software for this market unless he or she has the
right to create a clone of the original program that was written for use on
different hardware.
For these reasons, copyright should not protect programs from clones that
operate on hardware that is incompatible with the type for which the original
program was designed. s2 Although the Broderbund and Whelan decisions
arguably reached the correct result based on their facts, the court should not
33
have based protection in copyright law.
C.

Potential Markets for Programs with Different Underlying Purposes

The same user interface can be used for programs with underlying
programs that have different purposes. For example, the user interface for
Windows, a popular graphical menu program, could be imitated and used for
a word-processing program. The purpose of Windows is to organize multiple
programs and run them under a common user interface. The purpose of a
word-processing program is the production of documents, a goal unrelated to
the management of multiple programs. Although Windows can run a wordprocessing program under its user interface, the purposes of the two
programs are entirely different. Thus, the two programs are competing for
different markets. Each type of program serving a purpose other than that of
the original represents a potential market for the user interface of the original
program.
Although no decisions have discussed copyright disputes based on these
facts, protection of the potential market that exists for adapting user
interfaces to programs with different purposes would significantly chill the
development of technology. First, the potential market in this situation is too
speculative to warrant protection. A programmer could probably convert the
user interface for only a few programs, if any, before the program was
131. See note 117 and accompanying text.
132. One commentator has compared the activity of converting a program for use on different
hardware to "using someone else's idea for an internal combustion engine inside a four-wheel
vehicle to design a motorcycle." Karjala, 28 Jurimetrics J at 57 (cited in note 102).
133. Perhaps courts could remedy these types of fact situations by protecting the programs under
other doctrines, such as unfair competition under the Lanham Act, 15 USC § 1125(a) (1982), or
trade dress theory. See, for example, Beutel, 5 Computer L I (cited in note 96).
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outdated. 3 4 Second, the original author might not have the ability nor the
inclination to write other programs with different purposes.
The success of the Apple computer system testifies to the desirability of
135
common user interfaces for programs with different underlying purposes.
Standardization of user interfaces in this situation promotes efficiency and
reduces the need for undesirable retraining. 1 36 Standardization also
encourages users to employ more products.' 3 7 The user preference
monopoly argument becomes further persuasive in this situation because addin programs cannot be used to achieve sequential improvements. 138 Unless
courts allow a programmer to create clones of popular user interfaces, users
will be forced to learn a new interface for each program.' 3 9 Since programs
with different underlying purposes do not compete for the same consumers,
no useful purpose is served by requiring differences in user interfaces. 40 The
author's copyright monopoly is not damaged by programs that compete for
different consumers. In fact, the original author's program may increase in
value if its user interface gains popularity and is used by several programs.
V
A

PROPOSED TEST FOR INFRINGEMENT

Courts should adopt an infringement test with clearer language and a

stronger conceptual basis
outcome of future software
protection for computer
programmers from using
beneficial ways that cause

that would allow programmers to predict the
cases more accurately. Uncertainty in the level of
programs stifles innovation and discourages
the ideas and expressions of other authors in
no harm to the original authors' monopolies. 14

134. Although some programs have retained the same name for a number of years, they are
usually not the same original program because most are updated every few years to reflect changes in
hardware or software technology. Even if a program remains useful for five years, its lifespan is too
short to allow the average programmer to both update the original program and adapt the user
interface for programs with different purposes.
135. Karjala, 28 Jurimetrics J at 70 (cited in note 102); see Note, 52 U Pitt L Rev at 717-18 n 126
(cited in note 18) (explaining advantages of the Macintosh system).
136. Karjala, 28JurimetricsJ at 70 (cited in note 102). Standardization reduces training costs and
lost time since users do not have to learn how to use different user interfaces. See Note, 52 U Pitt L
Rev at 715 n1 16 (cited in note 18), citingJohn Markoff, For PC's, the Mouse Will Reign, NY Times DI,
col 3 (Oct 12, 1988) (corporate managers prefer standardized user interfaces like the Macintosh
because they reduce training time and expense).
137. See Note, 52 U Pitt L Rev at 715-16 n117 (cited in note 18), citing Peter H. Lewis, New
Software Shows OffMac's Best Features, NY Times C9 col 1 (Aug 23, 1988) (discussing surveys showing
that users of the Macintosh, which sports a standardized user interface across programs, use twice as
many programs as do their counterparts who use programs with non-standard user interfaces).
138. See note 117 and accompanying text.
139. Currently, to avoid the inconvenience of learning a different user interface for each
program, a user either must buy a computer system that operates under a standard user interface,
like the Macintosh or software that creates a standard user interface, like Windows.
140. Karjala, 28 Jurimetrics J at 70 (cited in note 102), citing Comment, Protecting the "Look and
Feel" of Computer Software, 1 High Tech LJ 411, 425 (1986) (authored by John Pinheiro & Gerard La
Croix).
141. See note 19 and accompanying text.
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This note proposes a three-part test for copyright infringement of the userinterface.
First, the trier of fact, aided by testimony from expert witnesses,' 42 should
examine the source and object code of the computer program for evidence of
literal similarity. Since the first part of the test focuses only on the literal
aspects of the source and object codes, the trier of fact should rely on the
traditional tests for copyright infringement developed for literary works such
as books. If the trier of fact finds literal or fragmented literal similarity in the
source or object code of the programs, the plaintiff should win without further
examination of the two programs. If literal or fragmented literal similarity is
not found, the trier of fact should move to the second part of the infringement
test.
Under the second part of the test, the trier of fact, again aided by
testimony from expert witnesses, should define the scope of copyright
protection for the nonliteral aspects of the user interface. To do this, the
factfinder should determine the specific audiences that the programs target.
If the programs do not compete in the same actual market, the factfinder
should conclude that the defendant's program does not infringe the plaintiffs
copyright. In this manner, only the actual market for the program will be
protected, not the potential markets for different hardware or for programs
with different underlying purposes.' 43 If the programs compete in the same
actual market, the trier of fact should then examine the user interface by
operating the program to determine which aspects of the user interface are
14 4
eligible for copyright protection.
142. Expert witnesses should testify about similarities that are caused by external constraints and
technological considerations. Additionally, the expert witnesses can aid the trier of fact to identify
portions of programs that should not be protected under the doctrines of merger or scnes dfaire due
to conventions of the software programming industry. See text accompanying notes 28-31.
143. The "commercial competitiveness" approach to separating idea from expression when
literal copying is absent reaches a similarly-limiting result by confining protection to programs that
are directly competitive with the original in a market that the original developer is likely to enter, and
to programs that represent the essential core of the two products, thus creating "direct and
pervasive" competition based on the original developer's work. Raymond Nimmer & Patricia
Krauthaus, Copyright and Software Technology Infringement: Defining Third Party Development Rights, 62 Ind
L J 13, 48 (1986); see also Karala, 28 Jurimetrics J at 80-81 (cited in note 102) (criticizing
"commercial competition" approach).
144. A full discussion of this point is beyond the scope of this note. However, careful application
of traditional copyright theories should be adequate to properly limit the scope of copyright
protection. The CONTU report contained extensive discussions of tradition doctrines that are
applied on a case-by-case basis and rejected proposed alternative limits on protection in favor of such
doctrines. Note, 88 Mich L Rev at 890 (cited in note 57). The "successive filtering approach" is an
example of a test that utilizes traditional copyright theories to eliminate all non-protectable elements
from analysis. See 3 Nimmer on Copyright at § 13.03[F] (cited in note 30); see also Note, 65 Notre
Dame L Rev at 548-50 (cited in note 32).
Some commentators argue that traditional copyright theories preclude the protection of any
aspects of the user interface. See, for example, Note, 39 Emory LJ at 1324-25 (cited in note 8)
(arguing that the terms of the command language, such as copy or save, are not protected by
copyright due to the doctrine of merger). However, commentators who fear that copyright
protection of the user interface will result in the appropriation of specific terms to the exclusion of
others misconstrue the nature of copyright protection. For example, if the phrase "Euclid alone has
looked on Beauty bare" were protected by copyright, others would still be free to use words such as
"Euclid" or "Beauty." Similarly, when copyright protects a certain passage of a song, others are free
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Finally, the trier of fact should assume the role of a computer-user in the
target audience and decide whether the competing program is an unlawful
appropriation of the plaintiff's program.' 4 5 At this stage, expert testimony
should be limited to explaining the use and functions of the program to
enable the trier of fact to assume the role of a user in the intended
audience. 1 46 Thus, as in the intrinsic part of the Armstein audience test, the
third part of this test is "merely an alternative way of formulating the issue of
substantial similarity."1

47

If the trier of fact correctly applies the first two steps of the test, and thus
limits the inquiry of the third step to the aspects of the user interface that are
properly subject to copyright protection, the dangers of offering too much or
too little copyright protection will be greatly reduced. Although similar
audience tests have been rejected by most courts in computer cases, the
proposed test limits the scope of the appropriation test through the testimony
of experts. The test also limits the examination by the audience to those
aspects of the program specifically designed for use by the audience. 148 In
this manner, none of the typical problems raised by technical issues are
present since expert testimony will only help the trier of fact assume the role
of the intended audience.
VI
CONCLUSION

Although most of the cases involving copyright protection of the user
interface appear to have been decided correctly on their facts, the language of
the decisions has left computer programmers uncertain as to the scope of
protection given to user interfaces. The courts should adopt an infringement
test that allows software programmers to predict the scope of copyright
to use the individual notes. Thus, copyright protection of the arrangement of words, such as that
proposed for the user interface, would not result in the appropriation of words themselves.
Copyright would protect against only identical, or nearly identical, arrangements within a user
interface. If identical or nearly identical arrangements are necessary for another reason, a court can
recognize this and not find an appropriation.
145. The issue of appropriation amounts to a question of "whether the defendant took from
plaintiff's works so much of what is pleasing to the ... lay [users], who comprise the audience for
whom such [program is written], that defendant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs
to the plaintiff." Arnstein, 154 F2d at 473.
146. Since the user interfaces are designed for the user and the user makes the market choices
whether to purchase a program, a user in the program's intended audience is the perfect trier of fact
to decide if the competing program infringes the plaintiff's copyright.
147. 3 Nimmer on Copyright at § 13.03[E] (cited in note 30), citing Ideal Toy Corp. v Fab-Lu, Ltd, 360
F2d 1021 (2d Cir 1966).
148. The "ordinary observer" test that is normally used in cases involving books, music, and
other traditional copyright works has been criticized when used in cases involving computers due to
the technical nature of software. See Whelan Associates, Inc. vJaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F2d 1222,
1232-33 (3d Cir 1986) (discussing the "ordinary observer" test); Note, Infringement of the Exclusive
Right to Prepare Derivative Works: Reducing Uncertainty, 73 Minn L Rev 1521, 1529 (1989) (authored by
Michael Wurzer), citing Note, Copyright Infringement of Computer Programs: A Modification of the
Substantial Similarity Test, 68 Minn L Rev 1264, 1285-88 (1984) (authored by Howard Root) (arguing
that expert testimony should control determination of infringement in computer software cases).
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protection for computer programs more accurately. An unambiguous test for
copyright infringement will remove the chilling effect of the current test and
further the goals of copyright.
In formulating a new infringement test for user interfaces, courts should
recognize the differences in market incentives and the role of standardization
for each type of market. Computer programs with substantially similar user
interfaces compete in one of three types of markets: the actual market, a
potential market for different hardware, or a potential market for programs
with different underlying purposes. This note argued that copyright
protection of the nonliteral aspects of user interfaces should be limited to
those uses involving the same actual market. However, even if protection is
not limited to the same actual market, the unique characteristics of each type
of market for user interfaces should inform courts' decisions. By adopting
either the test proposed in this note, or another test that considers the
potential markets for the user interface, courts can communicate the breadth
of copyright protection for user interfaces and thus encourage the
advancement of science and technology.
Todd D. Daubert

